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Summary 
A good society is first of all a livable society and the livability of a society manifests in the happiness of its 
members. Therefore a sociology of the good society requires an understanding of happiness, in particular 
answers to the following questions: 1) What is happiness precisely? 2) Can happiness be measured? 3) How 
happy are people presently? 4) What causes us to be happy or unhappy? 5) Can happiness be raised lastingly? 
Through the ages philosophers have toiled with these questions. Since the 1960's they are subject of empirical 
research. This paper takes stock of the progress. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This session is entitled 'The happiness of society'. Yet I will speak about happiness in society. Below I will 
define happiness as an individual state of mind. That definition does not apply to social systems. Citizens can be 
happy or unhappy but not societies. 
 The overarching theme of this conference is 'The good society'. One of the qualities that denotes a good 
society is its 'livability' and the livability of a society manifests ultimately in the degree to which its members 
live long and happily (Veenhoven 1996). This criterion links up with 'utilitarian' moral philosophy, which holds 
that social systems should be judged by their effect on "the greatest happiness for the greatest number".  
 
Contemporary study of happiness  
The study of happiness has long been a playground for philosophical speculation. By lack of empirical measures 
of happiness, it was not possible to check propositions about the matter. Hence, understanding of happiness 
remained speculative and uncertain. During the last decades, survey-research methods introduced by the social 
sciences have brought a break-through. Dependable measures of happiness have developed, by means of which a 
significant body of knowledge has evolved. This paper presents an account of this new field  
 
Development of the field 
Efforts to create a better society started with attacking the most blatant evils: ignorance, illness and poverty. 
Consequently, progress was measured by such thing as literacy, control of epidemic disease and elimination of 
hunger. Social statistics were developed for the registration of the progress achievements.  
 Advances in the combat of these plagues were followed by efforts to ensure a reasonable material 
standard of living for everybody. Progress on this matter was mostly measured by gains in money-income, 
income-security and income equality. This gave rise to an abundance of social research on poverty and social-
inequality, which is still a major research tradition nowadays. 
  In the 1960's, a new theme came on the research-agenda. At that time, most western nations had 
developed into affluent welfare states. Limits to economic growth were recognized and post-materialistic values 
gained field. This called for broader conceptions and measures of the good life. Consequently, new terms were 
introduced, such as`quality-of-life' and 'wellbeing', and older terms such as 'happiness' revived. Initially these 
notions were polemic, and served to denote that there is more than just material welfare. Yet soon, they 
developed into more substantive concepts and became subject of empirical investigation.  
 
 
Questions on happiness 
The literature on happiness can be framed within some key-questions. These questions can be ordered as steps in 
the process for creating greater happiness for a greater number. 1) What is happiness precisely? 2) Can happiness 
be measured? 3) How happy are people presently? 4) What causes us to be happy or unhappy? 5) Can happiness 
be raised lastingly?  
 Below I will provide a definition of happiness, and thereby answer question 1. On that basis, I will take 
stock of the answers to the other questions and explore their implications. 
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§ 1   CONCEPT OF HAPPINESS 
 
In this paper happiness is defined as the subjective enjoyment of life. To distinguish that meaning from other 
denotations of the word, I will first delineate the concept from other qualities of life' (§ 1.1) and next specify what 
kind of subjective enjoyment is meant (§ 1.2). On that basis, I will provide a definition (§ 1.3).  
 
§ 1.1 Happiness and other qualities of life 
Any statement about quality of life involves a judgement. In order to sort the various qualities involved, we must 
establish what life is evaluated, by what standards.  
 
Quality of what 'life'? 
The object of evaluation is mostly an individual life, the quality of life of a person.  Yet, the term is also used for 
aggregates, for instance when we speak about the quality-of-life of women. In that case, the term refers usually to the 
average of individuals. Sometimes the term is used in reference to humanity as a whole. In this context, the object of 
evaluation is mostly the average individual, and the long-term destiny of the species. The evaluation then concerns 
'human life', rather than 'human lives'.  
 The terms 'wellbeing' and 'happiness' are also used in reference to social systems. When speaking about the 
'happiness of society' (title of this symposium) we often aim at the collective level, how well society functions and 
maintains itself. Propagandists also exploit this ambiguity, in this case as a means to disguise differences in interest 
between individuals and society. 
 In this paper, I focus on the quality of individual human lives. As we will see, that is difficult enough. The 
conceptual distinctions presented below are discussed in more detail elsewhere  (Veenhoven 2000). 
 
What 'quality' of life? 
A classic distinction is between 'objective' and 'subjective' quality of life. The first refers to the degree that a life 
meets explicit standards of the good life, as assessed by an impartial outsider. For instance the result of a medical 
examination.  The latter variant concerns self-appraisals based on implicit criteria, for example, someone's subjective 
feeling of health. These qualities do not necessarily correspond; someone may be in good health by the criteria of his 
doctor, but feel bad. Based on this distinction, Zapf (1984: 25) has proposed a fourfold classification of 'welfare' 
concepts. When conditions of life score good on objective measures and subjective appreciation of life is positive, he 
speaks of 'well-being'; when both evaluations are negative, he speaks of 'deprivation'. When objective quality is good, 
but subjective appreciation is negative, the term 'dissonance' is applied, and the combination of bad conditions and 
positive appreciation is labeled 'adaptation'. 
 Though elegant, these distinctions have not proven particularly useful. The taxonomy does not explain 
much. The main reason is that the difference is more in observation than in substance. Objective health-assessment 
aims at the same qualities as subjective appraisals, though by different means. Further, the labeling gives rise to 
misunderstanding. The word 'objective' suggest indisputable truth, whereas the term 'subjective' is easily interpreted 
as a matter of arbitrary taste. This suggestion is false, the fact that income can be measured objectively does not mean 
that its value is beyond question.  
     
Chances and outcomes 
A substantively more relevant distinction is between opportunities for a good life and the good life itself. This is the 
difference between potentiality and actuality. I refer to this as 'life-chances'ii and 'life-results'.  Opportunities and 
outcomes are related, but are certainly not the same. Chances can fail to be realized, due to stupidity or bad luck. 
Conversely, people sometimes make much of their life in spite of poor opportunities. 
 This distinction is quite common in the field of public-health research. Pre-conditions for good health, such 
as adequate nutrition and professional care are seldom mixed up with health itself. Much research is aimed at 
assessing the relationships between these phenomena; for instance by checking whether common nutritional advice 
really yields extra years lived in good health.  Yet, in social policy discussions means and ends are less well 
distinguished. 
  
Outer and inner qualities  
A second difference is between 'external' and 'internal' qualities. In the first case the quality is in the environment, in 
the latter it is in the individual. Lane (1994) made this distinction clear by telling 'quality of society’ from 'quality of 
persons'. 
 This distinction is also quite common in public health. External pathogens are distinguished from inner 
afflictions, and researchers try to identify the mechanisms by which the former produce the latter, and the conditions 
in which this is more and less likely. Yet again, this basic insight is lacking in many social policy discussions.  
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Exhibit 1  
Four qualities of life 
 
  Outer qualities 
 
 
Inner qualities 
 
 
 
 
Life chances 
 
 
 
 
Livability of environment 
 
 
 
 
Life-ability of the person 
  
 
 
Life results 
 
 
Utility of life 
 
 
 
 
Enjoyment of life  
 
 
 
Livability of the environment   
The left top quadrant denotes the meaning of good living conditions. Formerly, the term 
'happiness' was often used for this particular meaning, especially in social philosophy. Currently, 
this matter is mostly called 'quality-of-life' or 'wellbeing'. Other terms are 'welfare' and 'level of 
living' 
 'Livability' is a better word, because it refers explicitly to a characteristic of the 
environment and does not have the limited connotation of material conditions. One could also 
speak of the 'habitability' of an environment, though that term is also used for the quality of 
The combination of these two dichotomies yields a fourfold matrix. This classification is presented in exhibit 1. 
The distinction between chances and results is presented vertically, the difference between outer and inner 
qualities horizontally.  
 In the upper half of the scheme, we see two variants of potential quality of life, with next to the outer 
opportunities in one's environment, the inner capacities to exploit these. The environmental chances can be denoted 
by the term livability, the personal capacities with the word life-ability. This difference is not new. In sociology, the 
distinction between 'social capital' and 'psychological capital' is sometimes used in this context. In the psychology of 
stress, the difference is labeled negatively in terms of 'burden' and 'bearing power'.  
 The lower half of the scheme is about the quality of life with respect to its outcomes. These outcomes can 
be judged by their value for one's environment and value for oneself.  The external worth of a life is denoted by the 
term 'utility of life'. The inner valuation of it is called 'appreciation of life'. These matters are of course related. 
Knowing that one’s life is useful will typically add to the appreciation of it.  Yet not all-useful lives are happy lives 
and not every good-for-nothing really cares.  This difference has been elaborated in discussions on utilitaristic moral 
philosophy, which praises happiness as the highest good. Adversaries of that view hold that there is more worth to 
life than just pleasures and pains. Mill (1861) summarized that position in his famous statement that he preferred an 
unhappy Socrates to a happy fool. 
 
Four qualities of life 
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housing in particular. Elsewhere I have explored that concept of livability in more detail 
(Veenhoven 1996:7-9).   
 Ecologists see livability in the natural environment and describe it in terms of pollution, 
global warming and degradation of nature. Currently, they associate livability typically with 
environmental preservation. City planners see livability in the built environment and associate it 
with sewer systems, traffic jams and ghetto formation. Here the good life is seen as a fruit of 
human intervention.  
 In the sociological view, society is central. Firstly, livability is associated with the quality 
of society as a whole. Classic concepts of the ‘good society’ stress material welfare and social 
equality, sometimes equating the concept more or less with the welfare state. Current notions 
emphasize close networks, strong norms and active voluntary associations. The reverse of that 
livability concept is ‘social fragmentation’. Secondly, livability is seen in one’s position in 
society. For long, the emphasis was on ‘under-class’ but currently attention shifts to ‘outer-class’. 
The corresponding antonyms are ‘deprivation’ and ‘exclusion’. 
 
Life-ability of the person  
The right top quadrant denotes inner life-chances. That is: how well we are equipped to cope with 
the problems of life. This aspect of the good life is also known by different names. The words 
'quality of life' and 'wellbeing' are also used to denote this specific meaning, especially by doctors 
and psychologists. There are more names however. In biology, the phenomenon is referred to as 
'adaptive potential'. On other occasions, it is denoted by the medical term 'health', in the medium 
variant of the word 2, or by psychological terms such as 'efficacy' or 'potency'. Sen (1992) calls 
this quality of life variant 'capability'. I prefer the simple term 'life-ability', which contrasts 
elegantly with 'livability'. 
 The most common depiction of this quality of life is absence of functional defects. This is 
'health' in the limited sense, sometimes referred to as 'negative health'. In this context, doctors 
focus on unimpaired functioning of the body, while psychologists stress the absence of mental 
defects. In their language, quality of life and wellbeing are often synonymous with mental health. 
This use of words presupposes a 'normal' level of functioning. Good quality of life is the body 
and mind working as designed. This is the common meaning used in curative care. 
 Next to absence of disease, one can consider excellence of function. This is referred to as 
'positive health' and associated with energy and resilience. Psychological concepts of positive 
mental health involve also autonomy, reality control, creativity and inner synergy of traits and 
strivings. A new term in this context is 'emotional intelligence'. Though originally meant for 
specific mental skills, this term has come to denote a broad range of mental capabilities.  This 
broader definition is the favorite in training professions. 
 A further step is to evaluate capability in a developmental perspective and to include 
acquisition of new skills for living. This is commonly denoted by the term 'self-actualization', 
from this point of view a middle-aged man is not 'well' if he behaves like an adolescent, even if 
he functions without problems at this level. Since abilities do not develop in idleness, this quality 
of life is close to the ‘activity’ in Aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia (Ostenfelt, 1994). This 
quality concept is also currently used in the training professions. 
 Lastly, the term 'art of living' denotes special life-abilities; in most contexts this quality is 
distinguished from mental health and sometimes even attributed to slightly disturbed persons. Art 
of living is associated with refined tastes, an ability to enjoy life and an original style of life. 
 
Utility of life   
The left bottom quadrant represents the notion that a good life must be good for something more 
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 than itself. This presumes some higher values. There is no current generic for these external 
turnouts of life. Gerson (1976: 795) referred to these kinds as 'transcendental' conceptions of 
quality of life. Another appellation is 'meaning of life', which then denotes 'true' significance 
instead of mere subjective sense of meaning.  I prefer the more simple 'utility of life', admitting 
that this label may also give rise to misunderstanding 3. Be aware that this external utility does not 
require inner awareness. A person's life may be useful from some viewpoints, without them 
knowing 4.  
 When evaluating the external effects of a life, one can consider its functionality for the 
environment. In this context, doctors stress how essential a patient's life is to its intimates. The 
life of a mother with young children is valued as higher than the life of a woman of the same age 
without children. Likewise, indispensability at the workplace figures in medical quality of life 
notions.  
 At a higher level, quality of life is seen in contributions to society. Historians see quality 
in the addition an individual can make to human culture, and rate for example the lives of great 
inventors higher than those of anonymous peasants do. Moralists see quality in the preservation 
of the moral order, and would deem the life of a saint to be better than that of a sinner.   
 In this vein, the quality of a life is also linked to effects on the ecosystem. Ecologists see 
more quality in a life lived in a 'sustainable' manner than in the life of a polluter. In a broader 
view, the utility of life can be seen in its consequences for long term evolution. As an individual's 
life can have many environmental effects, the number of such utilities is almost infinite.  
 Apart from its functional utility, life is also judged on its moral or esthetic value. 
Returning to Mill's statement that he preferred an unhappy Socrates to a happy fool, Mill did not 
say this just because Socrates was a philosopher whose words have come down to us; it was also 
because he admired Socrates as an outstanding human being. Likewise, most of us would 
attribute more quality to the life of Florence Nightingale than to that of a drunk, even if it 
appeared that her good works had a negative result in the end. In classic moral philosophy this is 
called 'virtuous living', and is often presented as the essence of 'true happiness'.  
 
Enjoyment of life   
Finally, the bottom right quadrant represents the inner outcomes of life. That is the quality in the 
eye of the beholder. As we deal with conscious humans, this quality boils down to subjective 
enjoyment of life. This is commonly referred to by terms such as 'subjective wellbeing', 'life-
satisfaction' and 'happiness' in a limited sense of the word. This is the kind of happiness the 
utilitarian philosophers had in mind.  
  
In evaluating our life, we typically summarize this rich experience in overall appraisals. For 
instance, we appreciate domains of life. When asked how we feel about our work or own 
marriage, we will mostly have an opinion. Likewise, most people form ideas about separate 
qualities of their life, for instance how challenging their life is and whether there is any 
meaning in it. Such judgments are made in different time-perspectives, in the past, the present 
and in the future. As the future is less palpable than the past and the present, hopes and fears 
depend more on affective inclination than on cognitive calculation. Next to aspects of life, we 
also judge life-as-a-whole. Bentham thought of that as a 'mental calculus', in which we 
balance 'pleasures and pains'. I will come back on that matter in § 5. 
Mostly such judgments are not very salient in our consciousness. Now and then, they 
pop to mind spontaneously, and they can be recalled and refreshed when needed.  Sometimes 
however, life-appraisals develop into pervasive mental syndromes such as depression or 
ennui.  
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§ 1.2 Happiness and other enjoyments 
Even when we focus on subjective enjoyment of life, there are still different meanings associated 
with the word happiness. These meanings can also be charted in a fourfold classification. In this 
case, that classification is based on the following dichotomies: 
 
Life-aspects versus life-as-a-whole 
Above, we have seen that appraisals of life can concern aspects, such as marriage or work-life, 
and one's life-as-a-whole. The word 'happiness' is used in both contexts. Obviously, such 
appraisals are linked. Enjoyment of aspects of life will typically contribute to the satisfaction with 
life as a whole (so-called bottom-up effect), and enjoyment of one's life-as-a-whole appears to 
foster the satisfaction with life-aspects (top-down). Still, these are not identical matters. One can 
have a happy marriage but still be dissatisfied with life-as-a-whole, or be satisfied with life-as-a-
whole in spite of an unhappy marriage.  
 
Passing delight versus enduring satisfaction 
The experience of enjoyment can be short lived or enduring. Again, the word happiness is used 
for both phenomena. Sometimes it refers to passing moods and at other occasions for stable 
satisfaction. Once more, these matters are related but not the same.  
 
 
Exhibit 2 
Difference with other subjective enjoyments 
 
 
     
 
Passing 
 
 
 
Enduring 
 
 
 
 
 
Life aspects 
 
 
   
 
 
Instant satisfactions 
(instant utility) 
 
 
 
Domain-satisfactions 
 
 
 
 
 Life as a whole 
 
 
 
 
 
Top experience 
 
 Life-satisfaction 
(happiness) 
 
 
 
Four enjoyments of life 
When combined, these distinctions produce the fourfold classification presented in exhibit 2. 
The difference between part and whole is presented vertically, and the distinction between 
passing and enduring enjoyment horizontally. 
 The top-left quadrant represents passing enjoyments of life-aspects. Examples are, 
Ruut Veenhoven 6 Happiness in Society
the delight of a cup of tea at breakfast, the satisfaction with a chore done or the enjoyment 
of a piece of art. I refer to that category as instant satisfactions. Kanahan (2000: ) calls it 
instant-utilities. 
 The top right quadrant denotes enduring appreciation of life-aspects, such as 
marriage satisfaction and job-satisfaction. This is currently referred to as domain-
satisfactions. Though domain-satisfactions depend typically on a continuous flow of instant-
satisfactions, they have some continuity of their own. For instance, one can remain satisfied 
with one's marriage even if one has not enjoyed the company of the spouse for quite some 
time. 
 The bottom right quadrant denotes the combination of passing experience and 
appraisal of life-as-a-whole. That combination occurs typically in top-experiences, which 
involve short lived but quite intense feelings and the perception of wholeness. 
 Lastly, the bottom-right quadrant represents the combination of enduring satisfaction 
with life-as-a-whole. The best word is life-satisfaction. This is the meaning the utilitarian 
philosophers had in mind when talking about happiness. When speaking about the 'sum' of 
pleasures and pains they denoted a balance over time and thus a durable matter.  
 
 
§ 1.3  Definition of happiness 
In this line, happiness is defined as the degree to which a person evaluates the overall 
quality of his present life-as-a-whole positively. In other words, how much the person likes 
the life he/she leads.  
 
Scope of evaluation  
The concept of happiness denotes an overall evaluation of life. Therefore, the appraisal that 
life is `exciting' does not mark it as `happy'. There may be too much excitement in life, 
and too little of other qualities. The overall evaluation of life involves all the criteria 
figuring in the mind of the individual: how good it feels, how well it meets expectations, 
how desirable it is deemed to be, etc. 
 
Kind of evaluation 
When we appraise how much we appreciate the life we live, we seem to use two sources of 
information: Affectively, we estimate how well we feel generally, and at the cognitive level we 
compare 'life as it is' with standards of 'how life should be'. The former affective source of infor-
mation seems generally to be more important than the latter cognitive one (Veenhoven 1996a: 
33-35). The word happiness is commonly used for these 'subtotals' as well as for the comprehen-
sive appraisal. I use the terms 'overall happiness' or 'life satisfaction' for the comprehensive 
judgment and refer to the affective and cognitive sub-appraisals as respectively 'hedonic level of 
affect' and 'contentment'. These concepts are delineated in more detail in Veenhoven (1984: 
chapter 2). 
 
Temporal range  
Appraisals of life can concern different periods in time: how life has been, how it is now, 
and how it will probably be in the future. These evaluations do not coincide necessarily; one 
may be positive about past life, but negative about the future. The focus of this paper is on 
satisfaction with present life. 
 Appreciation of present life is not the same as mood of the moment. One may be 
dissatisfied with life, but still feel euphoric occasionally. Momentous affect may influence 
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the perception of life-experiences and the global judgement of life, but it is not synonymous 
with happiness as defined here.  
 
Variable aspects 
Evaluations of life may differ in several respects. One difference is in their certainty: some 
people are rather definitive about their appraisal of life, whereas others vacillate. Another 
point of variation is how well considered the judgement is: some people judge rather 
intuitively, while others engage in elaborate contemplation. Furthermore, appraisals of life 
are probably not always equally appropriate. Like any perception they can be distorted in 
various ways, such as by mis-attribution and self-deceit. This is commonly referred to as 
`false happiness'. Distorted judgements of life are clearly less valuable as an indicator of 
apparent quality of life. Nevertheless, inappropriate happiness is still happiness. Unlike 
most philosophers, I do not preserve the word for denoting the 'truly good'.
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§ 2  MEASUREMENT OF HAPPINESS 
 
It is commonly assumed that happiness cannot be quantified and compared across time and 
nations like GNP. Yet happiness can be measured by asking citizens how much they enjoy 
life. In fact, happiness became a common topic in survey research since the 1960's. That 
development was accompanied by a sharp discussion about the validity of survey questions. It 
was doubted that happiness could be measured at all by means of standard interviews or 
questionnaires. 
 Measurement has long been understood as `objective' and `external' assessment, 
analogous to the measurement of blood pressure by a doctor. By now, we know that 
happiness cannot be measured that way. Steady physiological correlates have not been 
discovered, and probably never will be. Nor have any overt behaviors been found to be 
consistently linked to inner enjoyment of life. Like most attitudinal phenomena, happiness is 
only partially reflected in behavior. Though some social behaviors tend to be more frequent 
among the happy (active, outgoing, friendly), such conduct is also observed among unhappy 
persons. Likewise, non-verbal behaviors such as frequent smiling or enthusiastic movements 
appear to be only modestly related to self-reports of happiness. Consequently, estimates of 
someone's happiness by his peers are often wrong. Suicidal behavior is probably more 
indicative of happiness. Almost all people who attempt or commit suicide are quite unhappy. 
However, not all the unhappy seek resort to suicide. In fact, only a fraction does. 
 
§ 2.1  Survey questions on happiness 
Inference from overt behavior being impossible, we must make do with questioning. That is, 
simply asking people how much they enjoy their life-as-a-whole. Such questions can be posed 
in various contexts; clinical interviews, life-review questionnaires and common survey 
interviews. The questions can be posed in different ways; directly or indirectly, and by means 
of single or multiple items. A common survey question is: 
 
 Taking all together, how happy would you say you are: very happy, quite happy, not very 
happy, not at all happy?  (item used in the World Value Studies) 
 
The most common practice is single direct questions in the context of survey interviews. 
However, the validity and reliability of such simple self-reports is doubted. Elsewhere I have 
considered the objections and inspected the empirical evidence for claims about bias. I will 
summarize the main points below. For more detail and references, see Veenhoven 1984 
chapter 3. 
 
§ 2.2  Validity   
Critics have suggested that responses to questions on life-satisfaction actually measure other 
phenomena. Rather than indicating how much the respondent enjoys life, answers would 
reflect his normative notions and desires. 
 
No notion 
One of the misgivings is that most people have no opinion at all about their happiness. They 
would be more aware of how happy they are supposed to be, and report that instead. Though 
this may happen incidentally, it does not appear to be the rule. Most people know quite well 
whether they enjoy life. Eight out of ten Americans think of it every week. Responses on 
questions about happiness tend to be prompt. Non-response on these items is low; both 
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 absolutely (± 1%) and relatively to other attitudinal questions. `Don't know' responses are 
infrequent as well. 
 A related assertion is that respondents mix up how happy they actually are, with how 
happy other people think they are, given their situation. If so, people considered being well 
off would typically report to be very happy, and people regarded as disadvantaged should 
characterize themselves as unhappy. That pattern is observed sometimes, but it is not general. 
For instance, in The Netherlands, good education is seen as a pre-requisite for a good life, but 
the highly educated appear slightly less happy in comparison to their less educated 
counterparts. 
 
Colored answers 
Another objection concerns the presence of systematic bias in responses. It is assumed that 
questions on happiness are interpreted correctly, but that responses are often false. People 
who are actually dissatisfied with their life would tend to answer that they are quite happy. 
Both ego-defense and social-desirability would cause such distortions.  
 This bias is seen to manifest itself in over-report of happiness; most people claim to be 
happy, and most perceive themselves as happier than average. Another indication of bias is 
seen in the finding that psychosomatic complaints are not uncommon among the happy. 
However, these findings allow other interpretations as well. Firstly, the fact that more people 
say to be happy than unhappy does not imply over-report of happiness. It is quite possible that 
most people are truly happy (some reasons will be discussed below). Secondly, there are also 
good reasons why most people think that they are more happy than average. One such reason 
is that most people are like critical scientists and think that unhappiness is the rule. Thirdly, 
the occurrence of headaches and worries among the happy does not prove response distortion. 
Life can be a sore trial some times, but still be satisfying on a balance. 
 The proof of the pudding is in demonstrating the response distortion itself. Some 
clinical studies have tried to do so by comparing responses to single direct questions with 
ratings based on depth interviews and projective tests. The results are generally not different 
from responses to single direct questions posed by an anonymous interviewer. 
 
 
§ 2.3  Reliability  
Though single questions on happiness seem to measure what they are supposed to measure, 
they measure it rather imprecisely.  
 When the same question is asked twice in an interview, responses are not always 
identical. Correlations are about +.70. Over a period of a week, test-retest reliability drops to 
circa +.60. Though responses seldom change from `happy' to `unhappy', switches from `very' 
to `fairly' are rather common. The difference between response-options is often ambiguous. 
The respondent's notion about his/her happiness tends to be global. Thus, the choice for one 
answer-category or the next is sometimes haphazard. 
 Because choice is often arbitrary, subtle differences in interrogation can exert 
considerable effect. Variations in place where the interview is held, characteristics of the 
interviewer, sequence of questions and precise wording of the key-item can tip the scale to 
one response or the other. Such effects can occur in different phases of the response process; 
in the consideration of the answer as well as in the communication of it. 
 
Much of these biases are random, and balance out in large samples. Therefore, in large 
samples, random error does not affect the accuracy of happiness averages. Yet it does affect 
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correlations, random error 'attenuates' correlations. Random error can be estimated by means 
of multipletrait-multiplemethod (MTMM) studies, and correlations can be corrected 
(disattenuated) on that basis. 
 Some biases may be systematic, especially bias produced by technique of 
interrogation and sequence of questions. Bias of that kind does affect the reliability of 
distributional data. In principle it does not affect correlations, unless the measure of the 
correlate is biased in the same way (correlated error). To some extend, systematic error can 
also be estimated and corrected. 
 
 
§ 2.4  Comparability across nations 
Average happiness differs markedly across nations. In exhibit 3, we will see that Russians 
score currently 5.4 on a 0-10 scale, while in Canada the average is 7.7. Does that mean that 
Russians really take less pleasure in life? Several claims to the contrary have been advanced. 
Elsewhere I have checked these doubts (Ouweneel & Veenhoven, 1991, Veenhoven 1993). 
The results of that inquiry are summarized below. 
 The first objection is that differences in language hinder comparison. Words like 
`happiness' and `satisfaction' would not have the same connotations in different tongues. 
Questions using such terms would therefore measure slightly different matters. I checked that 
hypothesis by comparing the rankorder produced by three kinds of questions on life-
satisfaction: a question about `happiness', a question about `satisfaction with life' and a 
question that invites to a rating between `best- and worst possible life'. The rankorder 
appeared to be almost identical. I also compared responses on questions on happiness and 
satisfaction in two bi-lingual countries, and found no evidence for linguistic bias either. 
 A second objection is that responses are differentially distorted by desirability-bias. In 
countries where happiness ranks high in value, people would be more inclined to overstate 
their enjoyment of life. I inspected that claim by checking whether reported happiness is 
indeed higher in countries where hedonic values are most endorsed. This appeared not to be 
the case. As a second check, I inspected whether reports of general happiness deviate more 
from feelings in the past few weeks in these countries, the former measure being more 
vulnerable for desirability distortion than the latter. This appeared not to be the case either. 
 A third claim is that response-styles distort the answers dissimilarly in different 
countries. For instance, collectivist orientation would discourage `very' happy responses, 
because modest self-presentation is more appropriate within that cultural context. I tested this 
hypothesis by comparing happiness in countries differing in value-collectivism, but found no 
effect in the predicted direction. The hypothesis failed several other tests as well. 
 A related claim is that happiness is a typical western concept. Unfamiliarity with it in 
non-western nations would lead to lower scores. If so, we can expect more `don't know' and 
`no answer' responses in non-western nations. However, that appeared not to be the case. See 
exhibit 3 5. 
 
The issue of `cultural bias in the measurement' of happiness must be distinguished from the 
question of `cultural influence on the appraisal' of life. Russians can be truly less happy than 
Canadians, but be so because of a more gloomy outlook-on-life, rather than as a result of an 
inferior quality-of-life. This latter matter will be discussed in the last section of this paper.
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§ 3  PREVALENCE OF HAPPINESS 
 
Assuming for the moment that happiness is well measurable, we can go on to considering 
how happy people are in the present day world and to what extent they differ in enjoyment of 
life. 
 
§ 3.1  Level of happiness 
Throughout time, social critics have bemoaned the miseries of life. Man is said to be 
unhappy, and real happiness is projected in past paradise or future utopia. Optimists, who 
stressed human adaptability and social progress, have always denounced such bilious claims. 
By lack of an empirical gauge, the discussion remained inconclusive. During the last few 
decades many surveys have been carried out, some drawing on world samples (availble in the 
World Database of Happiness, Veenhoven 2001). Together, the data support the optimist 
view. 
 
Above subsistence level, most people enjoy life  
The first representative surveys were carried out in Western countries and showed an uneven 
distribution of happy and unhappy citizens; the happy outweighing the unhappy by about 3 to 
1. This finding raised much doubt about the validity of survey questions (as discussed 
previously). However, later cross-national studies showed that unhappiness prevails in third 
world nations, where a large proportion of the population lives at subsistence levels. This 
latter finding put to rest many of the aforementioned validity doubts. 
 
No mere resignation  
Nevertheless, some social critics are still reluctant to believe that modern man is happy. 
Reported happiness is discounted as sullen adjustment. Rather than really enjoying their life, 
people would just give up hope for a better one and try to adjust to the inevitable (e.g. Ipsen 
1978). Various defensive strategies would be used: simple denial of one's misery, downward 
comparison and a tendency to see things rosier than they actually are. Depressives would see 
the world more realistic. In addition to the above discussion on validity, two counter-
arguments can be mentioned: 
 Firstly, such resignation must give itself away in a discrepancy between the `adjusted' 
judgement of life and `raw' affective experience. Appraisal of affect is probably less 
vulnerable to cognitive adaptation, because it is a direct experience and thus less open to 
defensive distortion. It is also less threatening to admit that one felt depressed in the last few 
weeks than to admit disappointment in life. Various surveys have assessed both general 
happiness and last weeks affect-balance. The results do not suggest that people claim to be 
happy but actually feel lousy (research reviewed in Veenhoven 1984a: 106/113). Time 
sampling of mood-states also shows that pleasant affect dominates unpleasant affect (see e.g. 
Bless & Schwarz 1984 for a meta-analysis of 18 studies). 
 Secondly, people are typically unhappy when they live in miserable conditions. As we 
have seen, unhappiness is the rule in poor third world countries. In western nations happiness 
is typically lower where adverse conditions accumulate, such as in persons who are poor, 
lonely and ill (Glatzer & Zapf 1984:282-397). 
 Together these findings suggest that people tend to enjoy their lives once conditions 
are tolerable. From an adaptive-biological point of view, this does not seem strange. Nature is 
unlikely to have burdened us with chronic unhappiness. Like `health', happiness would seem 
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to be the normal condition. 
 
Why still so many complaints?  
The prevalence of happiness does not wash away the multitude of suffering and complaining. 
Even the happy are not without complaints. The German Welfare Survey found that half of 
the subjects who say to be satisfied with their life-as-a-whole report frequent worries (Glatzer 
& Zapf 1984:180). If not due to response distortion, what else can explain this pattern of 
worried happiness?  
 Firstly, it is important to note that happiness and complaining do not exclude each 
other logically. One can be satisfied with life-as-a-whole, but still be aware of serious deficits. 
In fact, both stem from a reflection on life.  
 Secondly, worrying may contribute to happiness in the end. Only through realistic 
acknowledgement of smart and danger can we cope effectively with the problems of life. 
 
§ 3.2  Differences in happiness 
Though most people enjoy their life, not everybody is equally happy. There are sizable 
differences between individual citizens within countries, as well as disparities in average 
happiness between countries. See exhibit 3. 
 
Individual differences 
In all countries, citizens are happy and unhappy. Though distributions vary, the full range 
between extremely satisfied and extremely dissatisfied can be found everywhere. Exhibit 3 
shows that even in affluent nations, such as Sweden and the USA, some 1% of the population 
marks the most negative scale category. In the most desperate case (Russia), still 6% report 
maximal happiness. 
  
Nation differences  
Exhibit 3 also shows that the pattern of happiness is not the same everywhere. Both level and 
dispersion differ considerably across nations. In this collection, averages vary between 5.4 
and 7.8, and standard deviations between 1,7 and 2.4. In greater datasets, differences that are 
even more sizable are observed. Other questions on happiness show identical patterns of 
cross-national differences (Veenhoven 1993). 
 Differences in average happiness in countries are largely a matter of variation in 
livability. Below we will see that 63% of these differences can be explained by variation in 
societal qualities. 
 The differences in dispersion of happiness are also related to societal characteristics, 
in particular to social equality. The background of these differences will not be discussed in 
this paper. The interested reader can find more information in Veenhoven (1990, 1995). 
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Exhibit 3 
Life-satisfaction in 10 nations early 1990's 
 
Nation  response categories    
      
      
   
satisfied dissatisfied     
 Mean 
  
 SD 
  
  10  9  8  7  6  5  4  3  2  1  NA   
Brazil      28  9  17  13  7  15  4  3  1  3  0.4  7,37  2,41 
Britain  18  13  26  19  9  9  3  2  1  1  0,6  7,49  1,94 
Canada  17  24  27  16  6  6  2  2  0  1  0.1  7,89  1,74 
France  8  11  21  18  13  18  4  3  1  1  0,9  6,78  1,98 
India       15  9  17  13  13  20  5  5  2  2  1,6  6,70  2,28 
Japan  3  6  23  19  21  13  6  4  1  1  4,0  6,53  1,75 
Nigeria  17  12  13  13  13  11  7  6  3  5  0,4  6,59  2,62 
Russia  6  4  11  10  12  23  10  11  4  8  2,6  5,38  2,40 
Sweden  21  19  30  14  5  6  2  1  0  0  0,2  7,97  1,74 
USA  16  21  27  15  7  8  3  2  1  1  0,3  7,73  1,83 
 
Source: World Datbase of Happiness (Veenhoven 2001) 
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§ 4  DETERMINANTS OF HAPPINESS 
 
 
Having established that people differ in happiness, the next question is why. The aim of 
creating greater happiness for a greater number requires an understanding of its 
determinants. 
 So far, the determinants of happiness are only dimly understood. Still, it is clear 
that various levels of human functioning are involved; collective action and individual 
behavior, simple sensory experiences and higher cognition, stable characteristics of the 
individual and his environment as well as freaks of fate. Exhibit 4 presents a tentative 
ordering of factors and processes in a sequence-model  6. 
 The model presumes that the judgement of life draws on the flow of life-
experiences, particularly on positive and negative experience. This is what the utilitarian 
philosophers referred to as "pleasures and pains".  
 The flow of experiences is a mental reaction to the course of life-events. This 
includes major one-time events, such as marriage or migrations, as well as repetitious 
mundane events, like getting up in the morning and doing the dishes.  
 The events that happen in life are partly a matter of good or bad luck, such as in the 
case of accidents. The occurrences of life-events also depend on given conditions and 
capacities. Traffic accidents are less frequent in well-organized societies and among 
attentive persons. Thus, the chances of `rewarding' and `aversive' events are not the same 
for everybody. This is commonly referred to as life-chances 7. Present life-chances root in 
past events and chance-structures, in societal history as well as individual development. 
 An example may illustrate this four-step model: A person's life-chances may be 
poor, because he/she lives in a lawless society, is in a powerless position in that society, 
and is personally neither smart nor nice (step 1). That person will run into many adverse 
events. He/she will be robbed, duped, humiliated and excluded (step 2). Therefore that 
person will frequently feel anxious, angry and lonely (step 3). Based on this flow of 
experience that person will judge life as-a-whole negatively (step 4). 
 Causality can skip a step. For instance, poor legal protection (step 1) may instigate 
feelings of anxiety (step 3) directly, because the person anticipates on events that are likely 
to happen, but have not occurred. Life-chances (step 1) can even enter the evaluation of 
life (step 4) right away, when comparisons enter the judgement. Likewise, not all life-
events in step 2 follow from life-chances at step 1. Some events are a matter of good or 
bad luck and happen irrespective of social position or psychological capabilities. Nor is the 
flow of life-experiences (step 3) entirely shaped by the course of events (step 2). How 
pleasant or unpleasant we feel also depends on dispositions and interpretations. 
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exhibit 4 
Evaluation of life; a sequence model of conditions and processes 
 
LIFE-CHANCES   ----------> COURSE OF EVENTS  --> FLOW OF EXPERIENCE ---> EVALUATION OF LIFE 
Livability of environment 
 Quality of society 
 -  economic welfare 
       -  social equality 
       -  political freedom 
       -  etc... 
 Position in society 
- material property 
- political influence 
- social prestige 
- etc... 
 
Life ability of the individual 
 Physical fitness 
 Psychic fortitude 
 Social capability 
 Intellectual skill 
 Art of living 
 Etc... 
 
 
 
 
 
Confrontation with: 
 
 deficit or affluence 
 attack or protection 
 solitude or company 
 humiliation or honor 
 routine or challenge 
 ugliness or beauty 
 etc... 
 
 
 
 
 
Experiences of: 
 
 yearning or satiation 
 anxiety or safety 
 loneliness or love 
 rejection or respect 
 dullness or excitement 
 repulsion or rapture 
 etc... 
 
 
 
 
 
Appraisal of average affect 
 
 
Comparison with standards of the 
good life 
 
 
Striking an overall balance 
                     Conditions for life-satisfaction                                appraisal process 
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§ 4.1  Livability of the environment 
Research on happiness has focussed almost exclusively on its relation to life-chances. 
 
Quality of society  
As shown in exhibit 3, average happiness differs greatly across nations. We have seen 
earlier that differences can not be explained by cultural bias in the measurement of 
happiness. We will see later that they can neither be attributed to cultural variation in 
outlook on life. On the other hand, there is a strong basis for interpretation of this variation 
in terms of differential livability of society. Exhibit 5 presents many strong correlations 
between average happiness and societal qualities. 
 
Material affluence  
Above in exhibit 5 we see that happiness is typically greater in the economically most 
prosperous nations. The richer the country, the happier its inhabitants. 
 The relationship with purchasing power is curvi-linear; among poor nations the 
relationship is more pronounced than among affluent countries. When the $20,000 point is 
passed, the regression line is almost flat, which suggest that the law of diminishing returns 
applies. Below we will see a similar pattern at the individual level: correlations between 
personal happiness and personal income are strong in poor countries and weak in rich 
nations.  
 The effect of economic affluence can partly be explained by its effect on 
prevalence of absolute poverty. Yet, the data show this is not the whole story. Apparently, 
material welfare provides more gratifications than mere subsistence. 
  
Security  
Happiness is also higher in the nations that provide most safety. In exhibit 5, we see strong 
relationships with physical safety and legal security, which appear to be largely 
independent of economic affluence. The relationship with state provided social security is 
less pronounced, and disappears when economic affluence is controlled 8. 
  
Freedom  
People are also happier in the nations that allow most autonomy. In exhibit 5 we see strong 
relationships with indicators of political freedom, which are largely independent of 
economic affluence. Correlations with indicators of personal freedom are less strong, but 
all positive. The relationship with perceived freedom is quite high.  
 Freedom in society can affect the happiness of citizens in several ways: Political 
freedom is likely to provide protection against injustice and assault. Personal freedom can 
make that people choose life-styles that better fit personal needs and capacities. Both 
effects are likely to result in more rewarding events. Opportunity-to-choose adds to 
happiness only in publics with a well developed capability-to-choose (Veenhoven 1996). 
 
Equality  
Exhibit 5 further shows some relations with social stratification. Surprisingly, there is little 
correlation with income-equality. Yet, there are pronounced relationships with gender-
equality and with absence of class-inequality.  
 Social inequality can affect happiness negatively by the frustrations and limitations 
it involves. Possibly, some kinds of inequality also involve positive effects, which balance 
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the negative ones. This may be the case with income-inequality. 
  
Cultural climate  
People appear to be happiest in the countries that provide most 'education' and 
'information'. The partial correlations show that the relationships are not independent of 
economic wealth. As of yet, it is still unclear as to what extent the common variance is due 
to knowledge, and how knowledge influences happiness. 
 Under the same headline, we also see some links with 'religion'. Belief in God in 
the country is positively related to average happiness, but religious participation is not. 
This suggests that the effect is mainly a matter of perceived meaning. 
 There are also strong links with 'values'. People are typically happier in the nations 
where individualism is adhered and authoritarianism is rejected, in other words, where a 
modern value-orientation prevails. These correlations are not independent of economic 
affluence. 
 
Social climate  
Exhibit 5 shows a strong link with 'tolerance'. The less prejudice, the more happiness. 
Correlations with 'trust' are less pronounced, but all positive. 
 Findings on social participation are contradictory. Contrary to common opinion we 
see that people are happier in the countries with the highest 'unemployment' rates 9. This 
underlines that involvement in work is not always beneficial to everybody. Common 
opinion receives more support in the correlation with 'memberships' of voluntary 
organizations. The more involvement in a nation, the happier its citizens. 
 Not surprisingly, people tend to be happier in a climate of 'peacefulness'. The more 
militarized society, the less happy its inhabitants. This relationship is independent of 
economic affluence. 
 
Population pressure  
At the bottom of exhibit 5, we see that happiness is unrelated to both population density 
and to population growth. This finding contradicts the theory that we still need the life-
space of the savanna in which the human species evolved. Apparently, we can live as well 
in a heap. 
 
Modernity  
Much of the above mentioned correlates of average happiness are part of the 'modernity' 
syndrome. Hence, similar patterns emerge if we consider further indicators of modernity, 
such as urbanization, industrialization, informatization and individualization. The more 
modern the country, the happier its citizens. 
 This finding will be a surprise to prophets of doom, who associate modernity with 
anomie and alienation. Though modernization may involve problems indeed, its benefits 
are clearly greater. 
 
Exhibit 5 
C  orrelates of average happiness in nations 48 nations 1990 
 
Nation characteristics  correlation with happiness N 
    Zero  affluence 
    order controlled  
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Material affluence 
Income per head: purchasing power 1989 10 +.64** --- 43 
Incidence of absolute poverty: 
* malnutrition: % < 2500 calories 11 —.16 +.12 42
* % without safe water 12            —.35 +.24 38 
 
Security 
Physical safety 13 
* murder rate  —.39** —.17 39 
* lethal accidents  —.67** —.49** 39 
Legal security: incidence of corruption14 —.73** —.50* 37 
Social security: state expenditures in % GDP15 +.38 —.03 34 
 
Freedom 
Political freedom16 
* respect of political rights  +.35* +.34 47 
* respect of civil rights  +.41* +.34 47 
Personal freedom 
* freedom of marriage: acceptance divorce17 +.18 +.02 42 
* freedom of procreation:  
 * abortion available18  +.13 —.12 37 
 * sterilization available19  +.18 +.27 34 
* freedom of sexuality20:  
 * acceptance of homosexuality +.62** +.20 42 
 * acceptance of prostitution  +.35 —.10 42 
* freedom to dispose of own life21:  
 * acceptance suicide  +.29 +.03 42 
 * acceptance of euthanasia  +.28 —.01 40 
Self-perceived freedom22: 
 * in life  +.50** +.24 42 
 * at work  +.74** +.47* 41 
 
Social equality 
Income-inequality: ratio lowest to highest 20%23 —.11 +.07 28 
Gender-equality: woman empowerment index24 +.51** +.07 35 
Class-inequality: educational homogamy25 —.52* —.58* 27 
 
Cultural climate 
Education 
*     % literate26  +.19 —.11 47 
*     school enrolment ratio27  +.51** +.26 36 
*     average years in school28  —.07 —.06 40 
Information29 
* newspapers pc  +.36* —.07 32 
* TV receivers pc  +.39** —.23 42 
Religion30 
* belief in God  +.38* +.40* 37 
* religious identification  +.24 +.20 41 
* religious participation  +.15 +.28 38 
Value orientation: Hofstede dimensions31 
* individualism  +.69** +.04 32 
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* power distance  —.50** —.05 32 
* masculinity  —.20 —.15 32 
* uncertainty avoidance  —.53** —.30 32 
 
Social climate 
Tolerance 
* absence of prejudice32  +.58** +.01 38 
Trust33 
* trust in people: 
 * in family  +.26 +.07 30 
 * in compatriots  +.02 +.10 40 
* trust in institutions  +.26 +.41 30 
Social participation 
* in work: unemployment34  +.42** +.34* 42 
* in voluntary associations: memberships35 +.52** +.28 34 
Peacefulness36 
* military dominance: soldier/civilian ratio —.38* —.46* 41 
* military expenditure in % GDP  —.25 —.26 41 
 
 
Population pressure37 
Population density: persons per km2  +.01 +.00 42 
Population growth: population doubling time +.06 —.13 39 
 
Modernity 
Urbanization: % urban population38  +.48** +.28 40 
Industrialization: non-agricultural share GDP39 +.49** +.03 32 
Informatization: telephones pc40  +.64** +.32 42 
Individualization: expert rating41  +.55** +.21 39 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Limitations of these data 
One of the problems in this field is the limited number of countries on which comparable 
data on happiness is available. As yet the data cover only Australia, Europe and North-
America completely. Africa is poorly represented in the data and the Middle East not at 
all. Some of the relationships could pan out differently in a more representative dataset. 
 The number of cases also limits the possibilities for multi-variate analysis. 
Spurious effects and conditional correlations cannot be described in much detail.  
 An other problem is the lack of time-series. This hinders the distinction between 
cause and effects. Most of the correlations in exhibit 5 can be explained as either caused 
by the nation-characteristic involved, or as an effect of happiness on that nation-
characteristic. For instance: the correlation with economic affluence may mean that 
material wealth makes life more enjoyable or that happy people create more wealth. 
 Fortunately, the number of cases is growing every year. Data on happiness is 
gathered in the ongoing World Database of Happiness, which already involves some 
interesting time-series (Veenhoven 1993).  
 
Individual position in society  
Numerous studies all over the world have considered differences in individual happiness 
within countries. Because most of these studies are inspired by egalitarian social policy, 
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the emphasis is often on social differences, such as in income, education and employment. 
Contrary to expectation these positional differences bear little relationship to happiness, at 
least not in modern affluent society. Together positional variables explain mostly no more 
than 10% of the variance in happiness. 
 
Social status 
Many studies have assessed links with social status variables. The guiding assumption is 
typically that people in advantaged social positions will take more pleasure in life. 
Differences are mostly in the expected direction, but small. 
 
Age Old and young are about equally happy in most countries. Contrary to common 
opinion life appears quite satisfying in old age, even in very old age. 
 
Gender  The happiness of males and females do not differ very much either. In some 
countries males are slightly happier, in others females. At this point, it still has not been 
established why. 
  
Income Another commonly investigated issue is the relationship of happiness with 
earnings. Studies in affluent welfare states typically find only small correlations, but in 
other countries quite substantial differences are observed. The poorer the nation, the higher 
the correlations tend to be. This pattern does not fit the theory that happiness derives from 
social comparison. This implication will be discussed in more detail in the end of this 
paper. 
 
Education The pattern of correlation with schooling is similar. Again high correlations in 
poor nations and low correlations in rich ones. Recent studies in rich nations show even 
slightly negative correlations with level of school-education. This does not mean that 
education itself breeds dissatisfaction. As we have seen the most educated countries are 
the happiest. The relative unhappiness among the highly educated is probably due to a lack 
of jobs at that level and possibly to the fading of earlier advantages in the process of social 
equalizing. 
 
Occupation There is more correlation with vocation. All over the world, professionals and 
managers tend to be most happy. It is not clear as to what extent this difference results 
from the rewards of work-tasks, related advantages or differential selection. 
 
Social ties 
Next to social-status matters, social-relations have been considered, both primary ties in 
the private sphere of life and secondary relations in public life. Together, these variables 
explain another 10% of the observed variation in happiness. 
 
Intimate ties Happiness is quite consistently related to presence and quality of private 
relations. However, not all kinds of ties are equally related to happiness in all countries. In 
western nations, the tie with a 'spouse' is more important than contacts with 'friends' and 
'relatives'. Studies in western nations showed that 'children' do not add to the happiness of 
married persons. However, among those who have children, happiness is closely related to 
quality of contacts with children. 
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Social participation  Happiness tends to be higher among persons who have 'paid work'. 
However, 'housewives' are not less satisfied. Neither does 'retirement' make life less 
satisfying. Happiness is more consistently related to participation in 'voluntary 
organizations'. 
 
 
§ 4.2  Life-ability of the individual  
The strongest correlations observed are at the psychological level; happy people are 
typically better endowed than the unhappy. The common variance explained by such 
variables tend to be around 30%. 
 
Health  
Happiness tends to be greater among persons who are in good 'physical shape' and who 
have a lot of 'energy'. The happy also share characteristics of good 'mental health' and 
'psychological resilience'.  
 
Mental proficiencies   
Curiously, happiness tends to be unrelated to 'intelligence'; at least to school-intelligence 
as measured by current IQ-tests. However, 'social skills' do differentiate between happy 
and unhappy. Happiness is typically accompanied by social assertiveness and good 
empathy attributes.  
 
Personality  
With respect to personality, the happy tend to be socially 'extravert' and 'open' to 
experience. There is a notable tendency towards 'internal control' beliefs, whereas the 
unhappy tend to feel they are a toy of fate. 
 
Much of the findings on individual variation in happiness boil down to a difference in 
ability to control ones environment. It has not been established as to what extent this 
pattern is universal. Possibly, it is more common in modern individualized western 
societies. 
 
Limitations of these data 
There are several problems with these correlational findings. Firstly, it is not always clear 
as to what extent the correlations are spurious. For instance, the positive correlation with 
marital status is partially produced by a selection effect; the married typically being in 
better mental health. This problem can be solved by systematic checks. A growing number 
of studies perform elaborate checks for spuriousness. 
 A second problem is the direction of causality. It is not always clear what is cause 
and what is effect. In the example of marital status, the positive correlation can result from 
advantages of married living as well as from better marriage chances of the happy. (In fact, 
both effects are involved. Veenhoven 1989) This problem can be solved by considering 
longitudinal data. As of yet, such data are scarce. However, the amount is growing. 
 A final problem is that effects can be conditional. For example, married status adds 
more to happiness in the most modern western nations such as Denmark and the 
Netherlands as opposed to more traditional countries like Ireland and Italy. Identification 
of such contextual effects requires comparable data in a sizable number of countries, 
preferably from different epochs. More and more of such data is becoming available. The 
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data needed for solving these problems is gathered in the previously mentioned World 
Database of Happiness (note 3). 
 
§ 4.3  Course of life-events 
The effect of life-events on happiness has received little attention. One of the few 
sophisticated studies that considered the matter is the four-wave `Australian Quality of 
Life Panel Study' by Heady & Wearing (1992).  
 First, this study showed that the course of life-events is not the same for 
everybody. Some people find troubles repeatedly; they have accidents, are laid off, quarrel 
with family, fall ill, etc. On the other hand there are also people who are lucky most of the 
time; they meet nice people, get promoted, have children who do well, etc. These 
systematic differences in the course of events depend to some extent on life-chances. In 
the study, favorable events appeared to happen more often to persons who were well-
educated and psychologically extraverted. Adverse events were more frequent among 
neurotics, but occurred less to people with good intimate attachments. Both favorable and 
unfavorable events happened more to persons who were young and psychologically open. 
Together, the life-chances considered explained about 35% of the variation in life-events 
over eight years. 
 The study also demonstrated that the course of life-events affects the appraisal of 
life. First, it was found that the balance of favorable and adverse events in one year 
predicts reported happiness in the next year. The more positive that balance, the greater the 
satisfaction with life. Life-events explained some 25% of the differences in life-
satisfaction, of which about 10% were independent of social position and personality. 
Next, longitudinal analysis indicated that change in characteristic pattern of events was 
followed by change in happiness. Respondents who shifted to a more positive balance 
became happier. 
 
§ 4.4  Flow of experience 
As of yet, hedonic experience is not well understood. Though the feelings of disgust and 
delight are quite tangible, it is not clear how they come about and why. 
 
Function of hedonic experience 
Much of our likes and dislikes seem to be inborn reactions to situations that are good and 
bad for human survival. Evolution has probably eliminated our forefathers who did not 
enjoy food, shelter and company, or lacked dislikes for danger. As such, certain life-events 
are likely to elicit pleasant experiences while others invoke unpleasant feelings. Playing 
tennis with friends is typically more fun than sitting in jail alone.  
 Though it is quite plausible that hedonic experience reflects the gratification of 
basic needs, it is not so clear what these needs are precisely. Current theory suggests that 
there are various `organic needs' (food, shelter, sex), `social needs' (belonging, esteem) and 
broader `self-actualizing' needs (mastery, control, variety, meaning, etc). Conceptions 
differ however, and it is difficult to establish to what extent these strivings are inborn and 
how they are linked to hedonic experience. 
 Cognitive theories suggest that pleasant experience can also be induced by 
perceived realization of goals. For instance, that we enjoy playing tennis because we 
successfully execute an intention and dislike the jail because it does not fit our plans. The 
gratifying effects of perceived reality-want fits may draw on an underlying need for 
control. 
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Pleasant and unpleasant events 
Many adverse events evoke similar reactions in most people, particularly events that 
exceed human adaptability. Everybody suffers when burned or starved. However, within 
the limits of human faculties, reactions tend to differ. For instance, not everybody feels 
equally as bad when his/her house burns down. Reactions vary with earlier exposure to 
hardship, with meaning attributed to the event and with psychological resilience. Still, 
most people get more or less upset by the loss of their property. Variability is probably 
greater in the pleasurable experiences people derive from life-events. Though most of us 
enjoy feasts, this is not true for everybody. Some people lack the social skills required for 
feasting, are not accepted by the participants, or are have a limited capacity for enjoyment 
anyway. 
 The various personal characteristics that mold experiential reactions on life-events 
belong to the same class of `life-chances' that also influence the course of events. Low 
social status may result both in few invitations for feasts and in uneasy feelings at the 
occasional celebrations one attends. Still, the life-events evoke experience and not the life-
chances.  
 Effects of daily events on daily experiences have been studied by means of time-
sampling. In this method, respondents note several times during the day how well they feel 
at that moment and what they are doing. Based on such studies Csikszentmihalyi (1991) 
found that we tend to feel better in company than we do alone and finer in leisure-
activities than we do at work. Structured leisure-activities such as sporting appeared more 
rewarding than unstructured pastimes, such as television viewing. This pattern is probably 
universal. Personality explains about 30% of the variance in pleasant affect; situations 
explain another 10% and person-situation interaction 20%. 
 
Inner manufacturing of feeling 
Though it is clear that events evoke experiences, it is not so clear how such effects come 
about. In fact, little is known of how likes and dislikes are processed. We have some idea 
about the psychophysiology of sensations, but the inner fabrication of affective experience 
is hardly understood. Psychology has been more successful in grasping thinking than 
affect. 
 In the 1960's, the discovery of pleasure centers in the brain seemed to promise a 
break-through (Olds 1954, Rolls, 1979). That promise has become somewhat bleak by 
now. There is no such thing as a single happiness gland. Pleasurable experience seems to 
result from different bio-chemical signals in both the body and the brain, the interactions 
of which are still largely unknown. 
 
Capacity for enjoyment 
Wherever situated, the human capacity for enjoyment is great. Reward areas in the brain 
seem to be greater than areas that produce unpleasant experience and most people tend to 
feel good most of the time (Bless & Schwarz 1984). Suffering may be more salient than 
satisfaction, but it is not more frequent.  
 There is some logic in this phenomenon. Why would nature doom us to be unhappy 
most of the time? If experiences of like and dislike serve to indicate conditions that are 
good and bad for the organism, we should expect that happiness is the rule. Evolution 
tends to produce a good fit of species to its environment, which will is reflected in 
predominance of pleasurable experiences. Dysphoric experience is to keep away from 
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harmful situations; it instigates withdrawal. Therefore, unhappiness can be permanent only 
in adverse living conditions from which no escape is possible. In such conditions species 
tend to die out.  
 In this view, chronic unhappiness can at best be a temporary phenomenon in the 
declining stage. However, the human species does not seem to be drawing to its end, and if 
we get extinct that will be due to ecological disaster rather than to maladaptation to our 
living environment.  
 The organic disposition to enjoy things may not be as strong in everybody. There 
can be temperamental differences in happiness-proneness. Twin-studies show greater 
resemblance in happiness between monozygotic twins than di-zygotic twins, even when 
reared apart. However, this does not mark happiness itself as a temperamental trait; the 
similarity in enjoyment of life can also result from other traits that are instrumental to 
happiness, such as heritable variation in `energy' or `resilience'. The results of a follow-up 
study from birth on do not suggest that there is a marked temperamental disposition to be 
happy or unhappy. Babies observed to be cheerful did not appear to be more likely to 
report high life-satisfaction in adulthood. (Research reviewed in Veenhoven 1994) 
 
 
§ 4.5  Inner process of evaluation 
What goes on in people when they evaluate their life? Speculations on these matters were 
a main issue in antique philosophy of happiness. This issue enjoys a renewed interest 
nowadays. It is not just curiosity about the inside of the black box that draws the attention, 
but rather the far-reaching consequences of the different points of view for the possibilities 
of creating greater happiness (to be discussed in the next section). 
 
Calculus or inference?  
Utilitarian philosophers spoke of happiness as the "sum of pleasures and pains", 
established in a "mental calculus". This view on the evaluation process is still dominant 
nowadays. Happiness is seen to be assessed in a similar way as accountants calculate 
profit. We would count our blessings and blights and then strike a balance. The judgement 
is then a bottom-up process, in which appraisals of various aspects of life are combined 
into an overall judgement. 
 In this line, Andrews & Withey (1976) suggested that satisfaction with life-as-a-
whole is calculated from satisfactions with life-domains. In this view, we first evaluate 
domains of life, such as our job and marriage, by means of comparing the reality of life 
with various standards of success, like `security' and `variation'. Next, we would compute 
an average, weighted by perceived importance of domains. Andrews & Withey 
demonstrate high correlations between satisfaction with life-as-a-whole and life-domain 
appraisals, but found no evidence for the presumed weighing.  
 Michalos' (1985) Multiple-Discrepancy-Theory also depicts happiness as the sum 
of various sub-evaluations. In his thinking, sub-evaluations are assessments of discrepancy 
between perceptions of how ones life 'is' with notions of how it 'should be'. The five main 
comparison standards are presented as: what one `wants', what one `had' earlier in life, 
what one `expected' to have, what one thinks `other people' have, and what one thinks is 
`deserved'. Michalos provides ample evidence that small discrepancies are accompanied 
by high satisfaction with life-as-a-whole. Multiple regression analysis showed that 
happiness is primarily a function of perceived discrepancy between reality and `wants'.  
 Though enjoyment of life-as-a-whole is statistically correlated with appraisals of 
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various aspects of life, it has not been established that happiness is causally determined by 
these sub-evaluations. The correlation can also be due to top-down effects. For instance, 
when assessing his job-satisfaction a person can reason "I am generally happy, so 
apparently I like my job". Panel-analysis has demonstrated strong effects of this kind. 
Actually, the effect of happiness on perception of have-want discrepancies is greater than 
the effect of gap-size on happiness (Heady et al 1991). 
 
Inference on the basis of feeling 
A rival theory is that evaluations of life draw on cues that provide indications of the 
quality of life-as-a-whole. An internal cue of this kind is how well one generally feels; if 
pleasant affect dominates, life cannot be too bad. An external cue is how happy other 
people think one is (reflected appraisal). 
 The available evidence suggests that internal affective cues are far more important 
than external social ones. Happiness is much more related to matters of mood than to 
reputation.  
 In assessing how we generally feel, we seem to focus on the relative frequency of 
positive and negative affects, rather than on the remembered intensity of joy and suffering 
(Diener et al 1991). A typical heuristic seems to involve departing from the mood of the 
moment, which can be read quite vividly, and next considering how representative that 
mood is for general affective experience (Schwarz 1991) 
 
Differences in evaluating life-as-a-whole and life-domains  
The evaluation-process is not identical for all objects. Global estimates are the rule in 
evaluations of life-as-a-whole and piecemeal calculations most common in life-aspect 
evaluations. 
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Exhibit 6 
Model of life-evaluation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Global 
 
Affective state 
informative? 
Specific 
 
Retrieve standard 
of comparison 
Evaluate 
Integrate 
 
Task 
 
? 
no
 
 
Special aspects 
 to be 
considered ? 
no yes  
 
 
te” Edit "priva
judgement Report 
yes 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Report 
Source: Schwarz & Strack 1991:43. 
 
 Schwarz & Strack (1991) showed that evaluations of life-as-a-whole draw on how 
one generally feels. This facilitates the judgmental task. Most people know well how they 
generally feel. The alternative of `calculating' happiness is more difficult and time-
consuming. It requires selection of standards, assessments of success and integration of the 
appraisals into an overall judgement. Not only does this involve more mental operations, 
but it also entails many arbitrary decisions. Still, people sometimes choose to follow this 
more difficult road. A condition that encourages calculative evaluation is uncertainty about 
one's typical mood. For instance, in depression it is hard to estimate how one generally 
feels. An other factor that invites to the calculative approach may be the availability of 
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salient information for comparison, such as the earlier mentioned confrontation with a 
person in a wheelchair. 
 Evaluations of specific aspects of life can less well be derived from estimates of 
general affect. One can be satisfied with ones job, but still feel generally lousy, because of 
a bad marriage and poor health. On the other hand, calculating is less difficult when 
specific life-domains are concerned. The field is easier to oversee and the standards are 
usually more evident. The differences in valuation strategies are depicted in exhibit 6.  
          As noted above, Andrews & Withey thought that satisfaction with life-as-a-whole is 
`calculated' from satisfactions with specific life-domains, by way of some weighted 
average. We can now conclude that this view is not correct. Not only did the presumed 
weighing fail to appear in better prediction of overall satisfaction with weighted domain-
satisfactions than with unweighed ones, but also have we seen that evaluations of life-as-a-
whole typically follow the left hand route in exhibit 6 rather than the right hand route. 
Though some people may sometimes strike the balance of their life in this calculative way, 
it is certainly not the typical approach. 
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§  5  POSSIBILITY OF GREATER HAPPINESS 
 
Much of the research on happiness is prompted by the hope of finding ways to create 
greater happiness for a greater number. However, the search could also lead to the 
conclusion that this hope is idle. For instance, if research confirms theories about 
happiness which imply that improvement of living conditions will not reduce discontent. 
One such theory is that happiness is relative. Another is the theory that happiness is a trait. 
 
 
§ 5.1  Is happiness relative? 
As we have seen above, one of the theories of how we evaluate life assumes that we 
compare life-as-it-is to conceptions of how-life-should-be. Standards of how life-should-
be are seen to draw on perceptions of what is feasible and on reference to others. Standards 
of comparison are thought to adjust. The more money we earn and the more our neighbors 
have, the higher the amount of money we would deem necessary for a decent living. 
Together these assumptions imply that it is not possible to create lasting happiness, at 
neither the individual level, nor the societal level. 
 At the individual level, this theory predicts that happiness is a short-lived 
phenomenon. We would be happy when life comes close to ideal, but in coming closer to 
ideal we would set higher demands and end up as equally unhappy as before. Likewise, 
social comparison would impede lasting happiness. When we have surpassed the Jones, 
reference drifts upward to the Petersons, and we feel unhappy again. This theory has many 
variations. 
 At the societal level, the theory implies that average happiness will fluctuate 
around a neutral level. Because individual citizens oscillate between happiness and 
unhappiness, the average will be in between. Social comparison is also likely to result in a 
neutral average; the happiness of the citizens who do better is neutralized by the 
unhappiness of the ones who do worse. Consequently, average happiness should be 
approximately the same in all countries. 
 
Empirical evidence 
Some often-cited investigations claim support for this theory. Easterlin (1974) saw the 
theory proved by his observation that happiness is as high in poor countries as it is in rich 
countries. Brickman et al (1978) assert that happiness is relative because they found that 
lottery-winners are not happier than paralyzed accident victims are. 
 Elsewhere I have exposed these sensational claims (Veenhoven 1991). Happiness 
appears not to be is not the same in poor and rich nations and neither are accident victims 
equally happy as lottery winners. The differences may be smaller than one might have 
thought, but they exist undeniably.  
 I also checked some other implications of the theory that happiness is relative. One 
such implication is that changes in living-conditions, to the good or the bad, do not 
lastingly affect the appreciation of life. However, there is good evidence that we do not 
adjust to everything. For instance, we do not adjust to the misfortune of having a 
handicapped child or the loss of a spouse. 
 Another implication I checked is that earlier hardship favors later happiness. 
Survivors of the Holocaust were found less happy than Israelis of the same age who got off 
scot-free. 
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 A last empirical check to be mentioned is the correlation with income. The theory 
that happiness is relative predicts a strong correlation in all countries, irrespective of their 
wealth. Income is a salient criterion for social comparison, and we compare typically with 
compatriots. This prediction is not confirmed by the data. In several rich countries, the 
correlation is close to zero. 
 All in all, there is no empirical support for the theory that happiness is relative. 
 
Theoretical flaws 
Proponents of this theory see happiness as a purely cognitive matter and do not 
acknowledge affective experience. They focus on conscious wants and neglect 
unconscious needs. Another fault is that they think of the evaluation of life as a piece-meal 
mental calculus (the route on the right in exhibit 6), rather than a global inference on the 
basis of general affect (the route on the left in exhibit 6).  
 As argued above, affective experience signals the gratification of basic needs. 
Contrary to `wants', `needs' are not relative. Needs are absolute demands for human 
functioning, that do not adjust to all conditions; in fact, they mark the limits of human 
adaptability. To the extent that it draws on need-gratification, happiness is not relative. 
 
Difference with life-aspect evaluations 
The theory applies better to some domain-satisfaction. For instance, income-satisfaction 
appears to largely a matter of comparison, and standards of reference on this matter have 
been shown to drift (VanPraag 1989). There are also indications for comparison processes 
in satisfaction with health and satisfaction with job. 
 As argued above, the evaluation of specific life-domains tends to follow the right 
hand route in exhibit 6. However, the evaluation of life-as-a-whole typically follows the 
left-hand route. Therefore, the theory does not apply to overall life-satisfaction. 
 
 
§ 5.2  Is life-satisfaction an unalterable trait? 
The other theory that denies hope of creating greater happiness for the greater number 
holds that happiness is a fixed disposition. This theory figures at the individual level as 
well as the societal level. 
 
Personal character trait? 
The individual level variant sees happiness as a psychological trait; a general tendency to 
like or dislike things. This tendency can stem from an inborn temperament as well as early 
experience. This trait is believed to shape the perception of life-experiences (step 3 in 
exhibit 4) as well as the overall evaluation of life (step 4). In this view, improvement of 
living conditions will not result in greater happiness. The evaluative reaction will remain 
the same; the discontented will always be disgruntled and satisfied will always see the 
sunny side of things. 
 Elsewhere, I have taken stock of the empirical evidence for this theory (Veenhoven 
199442, 1995). I inspected whether happiness is 1) temporally stable, 2) cross-situationally 
consistent and 3) innerly caused. None of this appeared to be the case. 
 Firstly, happiness does not remain the same over time, particularly not over the 
length of a lifetime. Individuals revise their evaluation of life periodically. Consequently, 
happiness changes quite often, both absolutely and relatively towards others. 
  Secondly, happiness is not insensitive to change in living-conditions. Improvement 
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or deterioration is typically followed by a rise or decline in appreciation of life. This 
appears for instance in the sequel of widowhood and divorce. 
 Thirdly, happiness is not entirely an internal matter. It is true that evaluations of 
life are influenced by personal characteristics. However, these inner alignments modify the 
impact of environmental effects rather than determine them. 
 
National character trait? 
The societal variant of this theory (folklore-theory) assumes that happiness is part of the 
national-character. Some cultures would tend to have a gloomy outlook on life, whereas 
others are optimistic. France is often mentioned as an example of the former kind, and the 
USA as an example of the latter. In this view, there is also little perspective greater 
happiness for a greater number. Even if the quality of life in France would be improved 
substantially, French misanthropy would prevent the French from taking more pleasure in 
life. Elsewhere I have examined the empirical evidence for this theory (Veenhoven 
1993:ch5, 1994, 1995). 
 I first inspected whether the differences in average happiness in nations are indeed 
unrelated to variation in objective quality of living-conditions in these nations. As we have 
seen in exhibit 5, that is not the case. People are clearly happier in the nations that are most 
affluent, safe, free, equal and tolerant. Together, these societal qualities explained no less 
than 63% of the variation in average happiness! Improvements in these societal conditions 
tend to be followed by a raise in average happiness. This is for instance visible in the 
rising happiness in Western Europe after World War II. (Not all improvements bear 
greater happiness however: as we have seen economic growth adds to happiness in poor 
countries, but not in rich ones.) 
 Next I regressed subjective happiness on objective livability of nations and 
considered the residuals. If French misanthropy reduces happiness, the French must report 
less happiness than their level of living would predict. In the regression chart, France must 
be situated below the regression line. Likewise, we can expect the USA to be situated 
above that line. No such patterns appeared however. 
 Lastly, I considered the happiness of migrants. I compared their appreciation of life 
with both average happiness in the country-of-settlement and with happiness in their 
country-of-origin. If happiness reflects the quality of the conditions one lives in, the 
happiness of migrants in a country must be close to the level of autochthons. If however, 
happiness is a matter of socialized outlook, the happiness of migrants must be closer to the 
level in their motherland. First generation migrants in two nations were considered: In 
Australia, migrants from Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Yugoslavia. In 
Germany, migrants from Greece, Italy, Spain, Turkey and Yugoslavia. Trait-theory failed 
this test as well. 
 Together these findings unequivocally deconstruct the argument that happiness is 
too static a phenomenon to be changed. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Happiness can be defined as subjective enjoyment of life-as-a-whole. Empirical studies on 
happiness show considerable difference; both difference in average happiness across 
countries and differences between citizens within countries. At its present stage, our 
understanding of happiness already shows that greater happiness for a greater number is 
possible in principle, and indicates some ways for achieving that goal.  
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Appendix 
Happiness in 48 nations early 1990's 
 
Nation Average appreciation of life 
code 
 
name  Happiness  Life- 
 satisfaction 
 Affect 
 Balance 
RA Argentina*  6,90  6,95  6,26 
AUS Australia 7,67 7,90 7,04 
A Austria  7,33  6,13  6,77 
WY Belarus (White Russia)  4,87  5,02  5,77 
B Belgium  7,70  7,39  6,57 
BR Brazil  6,47  7,10  6,18 
GB Britain  7,60  7,19  6,71 
BG Bulgaria  4,43  4,48  - 
CND Canada  6,83  7,65  7,31 
RCH Chile*  6,78  7,28  6,03 
CN China*  6,40  6,72  6,28 
CZ Czecho-Slovakia (former)  5,57  5,89  5,67 
DK Denmark  7,87  7,96  6,93 
EW Estonia  5,27  5,55  5,77 
SF Finland  6,97  7,42  6,18 
F France  7,20  6,43  6,33 
D Germany (former West-)  6,80  6,91  6,47 
DDR Germany (former East-)  6,53  6,35  5,94 
G Greece  5,90  5,60  - 
H Hungary  5,73  5,59  5,86 
IS Iceland  7,93  7,79  7,53 
IND India*  6,03   5,80  5,33 
IRL Ireland  7,87  7,64  7,03 
IL Israel  6,27  -  - 
I Italy  6,60  6,69  6,24 
J Japan  6,66  6,13  5,26 
LR Latvia  5,08  5,23  5,92 
LT Lithuania  4,97  5,57  5,60 
L Luxembourg  7,27  7,60  - 
MEX Mexico  6.50  7,12  6,58 
NI Northern Ireland  7,63  7,65  6,72 
NZ New Zealand  7,22  -  - 
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Nation Average appreciation of life 
code 
 
name  Happiness  Life- 
 satisfaction 
 Affect 
 Balance 
NL Netherlands  7,97  7,60 
 6,87 
WAN Nigeria  6,43  6,02  6,54 
N Norway  7,43  7,43 
 7,31 
RP Philippines  6,93  -  - 
PL Poland  6,57  6,27  6,46 
P Portugal  6,10  6,76  6,36 
RO Romania  5,43  5,42  5,71 
SU Russia  5,10  4,51  5,33 
ZA South Africa  6,07  6,01  6,21 
ROK South Korea  6,20  6,32  - 
SLO Slovenia  5,40  5,88  6,53 
SP Spain  6,80  6,82  5,73 
S Sweden  7,87  7,75  7,90 
CH Switzerland  7,67  8,21  - 
TR Turkey*  6,93   6,01  5,60 
US United States of America  7,60       7,46  7,23 
 
Data from World Database of Happiness (update 1996), tables 1.1.1a and 1.1.1b. Most of the data from World Value Study 2. Scores 
transformed to scale 0-10 
* Probably too high. Score based on samples in which poor rural population was under-represented 
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1. Postadress: POB 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, Netherlands. E-mail: veenhoven@soc.fsw.eur.nl 
2. There are three main meanings or health: The maxi variant is all the good (WHO definition), the 
medium variant is life-ability, and the mini-variant is absence of physical defect 
 
3. A problem with this name is that the utilitarians used the word utility for subjective appreciation of 
life, the sum of pleasures and pains. 
 
4. Frankl's (1946) logo-therapy aims to make people believe in meanings of their life they do not see. 
 
5. In Japan do we see a higher non-response indeed, though still below 5%. Still this not a general non-
western pattern. In India and Nigeria non-response is at the same level as in western nations. 
6.  This model is inspired by the "Stocks and Flows" framework proposed by Heady and Wearing (1991). 
What these authors call "stocks" is referred to as individual "life-chances" here. Heady & Wearing did 
not include societal differences. The term "flows" covers both `life-events' and derived `psychic 
income'. Here these matters are distinguished. The reason is that reactions on events may differ. Not 
everybody suffers under job-loss, some actually revive. 
7. The concept of `life-chances' is used here in a broad sense, and refers to all conditions that affect 
probabilities of fortune or adversity. The term is also used in more narrow meanings. Sometimes it 
refers to societal conditions only; for instance when we say that life-chances are poor in developing 
countries. On other occasions the term refers to positional differences within societies; for example, 
when we say that unskilled manual workers have less chances in life. Mostly the concept is restricted 
to opportunities provided by society, and does not include differences in individual capacities.   
8. Elsewhere I have investigated that matter in more detail on another dataset. Comparing across nations 
in the early 1980's, I found greater correlations between average happiness and welfare expenditures, 
but these correlations also disappeared when economic affluence was controlled. Comparison trough 
time in some countries showed that happiness had not increased more in the nations where the welfare-
state had expanded most. (Veenhoven & Ouweneel 1995).  
9. This effect is largely due to the former communist countries in this dataset. At the time of this study 
these unhappy countries still had full employment (at least officially). When these cases are omitted, 
the correlation is reduced to zero, which is still not the negative relationship one would expect. 
10. UN Human Development Report 1992, table 1. Missing values estimated: Northern Ireland between 
Great Britain and Ireland ($ 10,600), Czecho-Slovakia average of neighboring East European nations 
($ 7,420). 
11. Kurian 1992, table 192. The minimally required amount of daily categories is about 2500. In this 
dataset only four countries score below that level: India, China, Nigeria and the Philippines. 
12. Kurian 1992, table 194. Data 1980. Some scores seem implausible (Finland 84%, Spain 78%, Hungary 
44%) 
13. Medical registration. UN Demographic Yearbook 1993, table 21. 
14. Polls among business men and journalists. Transparency International 1995. 
15. ILO 1996, table 3 
16. Expert ratings. Karantnycky et al 1995. 
NOTES 
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17. Public opinion. Item 310 in World Value Survey 2. 
18. Expert rating of restrictive policies. PAI 1995. 
19. Expert rating of limitations and services, IPPF 1995. 
20. Public opinion. Survey items 307 and 308 in World Values Survey 2. 
21. Public opinion. Items 312 and 313 in World Values Survey 2. 
22. Public opinion. Items 95 and 117 in World Values Survey 2. 
23. UN Human Development Report 1995, table 12. 
24. UN Human Development Report 1995, table 3.5. 
25. Smits et al 1996: 48 
26. World Bank, World Development Report, 1995, table 1. 
27. World bank, World Development Report 1995, table 3.1. 
28. Average self estimates. Item 356 in World Values survey 2. 
29. Kurian 1992, tables 218 and 214. 
30. Average self reports. Items 175, 151 and 147 in World Values Survey 2. 
31. Opinions IBM employees. Hofstede 1990 
32. Public opinion. Items 69-82 in World Vlues Survey 2. 
33. Public opinion. Items 272-285, 340 and 341 in World Vlues Survey 2. 
34. Labor force surveys and registrations. ILO 1995, table 9. 
35. Average self reports. Item 23 in World values Survey 2. 
36. Kurian 1992, tables 41 and 43. 
37. Kurian 1992, tables 17 and 28. 
38. Kurian 1992, table 18. 
39. Kurian 1992, table 84. 
40. Kurian 1992, table 167. 
41. Diener et al 1994, table 1. 
42. This paper has been criticized by Stones et al (1995). A rejoinder appears in Veenhoven (1997b). 
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